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Civil society and media governance: a participatory approach
Abstract
The paper starts from the assumptions that firstly we are moving from a hierarchical form of
government to a more heterarchical one and secondly that media policy and politics denote some lack of
democratic accountability. After outlining the democratic deficit in media policy and politics we review
the core literature about media governance in order to outline the main features, which media scholars
have identified in their works. We come to the conclusion that the literature about media governance
oversimplifies the power structures in the media system by pointing out the importance of interactions,
coordination and participation that in fact are no more than a simple consultation. We thus focus on a
participatory conceptualization of governance. From the standpoint of mass mediated communication it
is clear that every social group in modern society is a relevant stakeholder that should participate in the
definition of the media policy framework, since mass media play a pivotal role by delivering
information about important political and social issues. Through a set of interviews with civil society
representatives that are participating in advertising regulation authorities in France and the UK we
outline the main benefits of involving civil society actors in the decision making process. We conclude
with some recommendations about transferring the participatory experience of the two case studies to
such media sectors that are vital for the diffusion of political and social information. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This paper starts from the assumptions that firstly we are moving from a hierarchical form of 
government to a more heterarchical one and secondly that media policy and politics denote 
some lack of democratic accountability. The first assumption can be extrapolated from most 
scientific papers and discourses about governance which were published since the nineties 
(Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Kooiman 1993; Pierre and Peters 2000; Benz 2004; Mayntz 
2005). In fact, from corporate governance to public and good governance the participation and 
involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the decision-making process is a pivotal principle 
on what the analysis of the argument is based. The second assumption is more political and 
relates to the lack of representation of civil society in media policy matters. On the one side, 
few if any of the academic papers analyzed the participation of civil society organizations in 
media policy processes. On the other side and in light of the growing participation of media 
companies in the (self-)regulation of media matters, one could provocatively ask if we are 
moving toward a completely self-regulated media system. 
This paper is part of the research project “From Media Regulation to Democratic Media 
Governance”, financed by the Swiss National Foundation for Scientific Research. In 
particular we try to fill the research gap related to the participation of civil society in media 
policy matters and look to what extend the involvement of civil society organizations may 
lead to a more democratic output. 
In the following of this paper we will first outline some aspects of the democratic deficit in 
media policy. Secondly, the concept of media governance and the related regulation forms 
will be sketched from the perspective of different media scholars. We will then introduce a 
participatory approach to media politics and use it to analyze two case studies, where civil 
society organizations participate in media governance institutions. Finally some problems 
related to the participation of civil society in the regulation of media systems will be outlined. 
THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT IN MEDIA POLICY 
From a public interest standpoint the last 10 to 15 years of media policy and media regulation 
have not been a success story at all. Both in Europe and the U.S. the public interest in media 
regulation seems to be relegated to matters of secondary concern, whereas the economic 
interests within the different media systems are on the top of the policy agenda. Integration 
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and ownership-concentration strengthen the leading media corporations. They successfully 
defend every attempt to limit their economic growth. Looking at the deregulation measures in 
the area of the media, one could even talk of the state promotion of concentration. The state 
and its subordinate authorities tend to promote mergers and acquisitions than attempt to retain 
them. Since the nineties and across Europe and the U.S., politicians and policymakers have 
favored the deregulation of media ownership rules without having looked closer at the 
democratic consequences of such moves. 
In analyzing the paradigm shifts in media policy Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003) identify 
three main phases of media policy. The first one begins with the industrialization of mass 
media in the mid 19th century and focused on the development of media infrastructures and 
securing the national interests in economically healthy media systems. The second phase, 
from the end of the second world war untill the eighties, was concerned more with “normative 
and political than technological considerations” (2003: 191). After a turbulent period during 
the eighties, where public interest values where increasingly challenged by economic 
imperatives, the convergence of different communication technologies shifted the policy 
focus back on the development of infrastructures and of an economic environment capable of 
ensuring media actors that are “able to provide for the current and expanding communication 
needs of society” (Van Cuilenburg/McQuail 2003: 199). Indeed, the third phase of media 
policy paradigms that continues untill today shifted the attention away from social welfare to 
economic welfare principles. The authors note that “under emerging conditions, policy has 
generally to follow the logic of the marketplace and the technology”, whereas “the ‘public 
interest’ is being significantly redefined to encompass economic and consumerist values”. 
(Van Cuilenburg/McQuail 2003: 200). 
Following the analysis of Van Cuilenburg and McQuail the emerging paradigm shifts the core 
values of media policy away from a (desirable) balance between political, social-cultural and 
economic values towards a predominance of the latter. Issues like competition, employment 
and innovation are central to media policy, whereas societal or political concerns are object of 
regulation only in the case of consumers’ protection or “where issues of morality, taste, 
human rights and potential harm to young people and society are concerned”. (Van 
Cuilenburg/McQuail 2003: 200f). 
For McQuail (2008: 18f) the transition from the old order of media governance, characterized 
by strong public control of broadcasting and a clear separation between print and electronic 
media, to the new order can be explained through the greater degree of commercialization and 
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marketization of all forms of public communication, by the higher “centrality and 
pervasiveness” of electronic media and by the decline of national sovereignty over the content 
and flow of media content. 
This perceived decline of public control over the mass media, of media accountability toward 
society and the lack of public control over the new technological developments within media 
systems determine the continuity between the old and the new order concerning a “set of 
perennial problems arising from the nature of communication and the important (and probably 
increased) role it plays in organized social life, from global to local.” (McQuail 2008: 25). 
McQuail lists a set of issues with both international and national dimensions, which should be 
addressed by media governance. These are (ebd.): 
• Achieving due accountability for ethical, moral and professional standards of media 
performance, as decided by the larger community; 
• Protecting individuals and society from potential harm of many kinds that can occur 
by way of communication systems; 
• Setting positive expectations and goals for public social and cultural communication 
and steering the development of systems accordingly; 
• Maintaining essential freedoms of communication under conditions of total 
surveillance and registration; 
• Managing relations between state and political power on the one hand and 
communicative power on the other, according to democratic principles. 
The political values of access, freedom, diversity, information and control and accountability 
of media companies toward the civil society are meant to be implemented through market 
principles and competition law. In our view however, the application of general competition 
legislation alone is insufficient. Competition law indeed emphasizes the dangers of market 
dominance, but in the case of media regulation anti-trust mechanisms alone do not ensure 
neither media pluralism nor democratic accountability of media companies toward civil 
society. The global concentration of the media companies in the hands of few big 
multinational corporations is a paradigmatic result of the national and international media 
policies. Even in the different national media systems the trend is toward the concentration of 
media power in the hands of a handful of companies. 
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These developments raise some fundamental questions about the agglomeration of media 
power. How much media power concentration is democratically tolerable and where does the 
abuse of power begin? Or from another perspective, how is this power held accountable to 
society? It is here where the democratic deficit in media policy is situated, i.e. where the 
accountability of media companies toward the society is a matter of economic principles 
ensuring rather the interests of shareholders than those of the stakeholders. One must not 
forget, that mass media are central to the democratic functioning of modern societies, since 
their work ensure the publication of relevant information, which build the basis of every 
political debate. 
Due to the growing democratic deficit on a national as well on the international level, further 
options for new policies have to be developed in order to promote a better accountability of 
media companies toward its stakeholders. Beside an active intervention by the state, 
transparency of media ownership data has to be improved, so that the public is able to 
recognize potential conflicts of interests and the abuse of power. Regulatory and self-
regulatory mechanisms for ensuring editorial independence should be vital. The mechanisms 
for lodging complaints and judging these complaints should also be enhanced in such a way 
that they include journalists, owners and the public as equal participants. 
And it is at this point where the concept of governance comes into play. In our research 
project “From Media Regulation to Democratic Media Governance” we followed the 
scientific discourse about governance and media governance and analyzed to what extent the 
core values of the discourse, i.e. participation of the relevant stakeholders and a shift from 
hierarchical to heterarchical decision-making processes (cfr. Smismans 2008: 874f), are being 
implemented in media governance agreements in the different European countries. The 
assumption behind the project is that the democratic deficit of media policies can be 
overcome through the new governance approach by implementing new decision-making 
processes, where the civil society as main stakeholder of media companies can bargain for its 
interests. The main questions are thus: how may civil society participate in media policy 
decisions? And how do civil society organizations perceive their participation? 
TOWARDS A DEFINITION OF MEDIA GOVERNANCE 
The assumption underlying the governance research is that we are moving from government 
to governance. From a political science perspective the shift to new governance approaches is 
characterized by participation and power-sharing, multi-level integration, diversity and 
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decentralization, deliberation, flexibility and revisability, experimentation and knowledge 
creation (Scott/Trubek 2002: 5f). However, the state is and remains a central actor in the 
institutionalization even of non-governmental approaches (cfr. Pierre/Peters 2005: 133ff). 
In media politics the involvement of other actors than the media companies and the state may 
help countering the democratic deficit in media policy. The concept of (media) governance is 
not simply a further development of steering theories, but represents a shift of perspective 
(cfr. Mayntz 2005: 13ff). The shift toward a governance discourse is also seen as a 
consequence of the growing complexity of modern societies, where the state, the market, 
social networks and communities together are considered as institutional regulation 
mechanisms (cfr. Benz 2004: 20). 
In general the governance debate shifts the focus from steering theories and the role of the 
state in regulating different sectors of society to the importance of different forms of 
regulation, to the involvement of more actors in the regulation process and to the emergence 
of new forms of governance not only at the nation-state level, but also at local, regional, 
national, transnational and global levels as well as in the private and public spheres (cfr. Van 
Kersbergen/Van Waarden 2004: 143). The state and its actions are no more the pivotal point 
of analysis, but rather the modus of regulation self is examined. 
From this perspective, media governance looks beyond governments, markets and corporate 
media managements as traditional regulating actors. Media governance focuses in particular 
on non-governmental modes of institutionalization and organization, since media regulation in 
particular may take advantage of new modes of regulation that are less state centered and 
accordingly less politicized. 
Freeman (2008: 14) differentiates between media policy, media regulation and media 
governance and defines the three as follow: 
• Media policy refers to the development of goals and norms leading to the creation of 
instruments that are designed to shape the structure and behavior of media systems. 
• Media regulation focuses on the operation of specific, often legally binding tools that 
are deployed on the media to achieve established policy goals. 
• Media governance refers to the total sum of mechanisms, both formal and informal, 
national and supranational, centralized and dispersed, that aim to organize media 
systems according to the resolution of media policy debates. 
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Another definition of media governance is given by Denis McQuail, who defines media 
governance as covering “all means by which the mass media are limited, directed, 
encouraged, managed, or called into account, ranging from the most binding law to the most 
resistible of pressures and self-chosen disciplines” (McQuail 2003: 91). 
Hamelink and Nordenstreng (2007: 232) note that media “media governance encompasses the 
governance of a professional group, of the commons, of productive processes, of content 
distribution, and of media-society relations”. In the opinion of the authors media governance, 
due to its complexity, “will have to be a mixture of different governance modalities such as: 
self-governance, cooperative governance and interventionist governance” 
(Hamelink/Nordenstreng 2007: 233) 
 
To sum up, media governance refers to a whole set of centralized and dispersed mechanisms 
with the aim to organize mass media from the inside and the outside. In our view, media 
governance has to focus both on the highly institutionalized and less institutionalized power 
relations within the media organizations and on the relationship between the media as 
political, economic and cultural institution and the society. The main benefit of the debate 
about governance and its application to media politics is the shift of the discourse from the 
state centered and ideological loaded perspective to a less political and more process oriented 
discussion about media regulation. However there is the risk of moving in direction of less 
democratic control about media systems especially if the organized interests of civil society 
are not taken into account.  
MEDIA GOVERNANCE AS REGULATION FORM 
The emergence of governance as a concept describing the transition from classical top-down 
media policy to more horizontal steering represents the assumption that the lawmakers are 
losing ground in the implementation of different policies. According to Held (2007) the 
growing interest in governance as a new regulatory concept is related to the failure of 
traditional regulation of command-and-control. A failure due to the fact that “traditional 
regulation ignores the interests of the regulated objects and that initiative, innovation, and 
commitment cannot be imposed by law, the increasing knowledge gap of the regulating state, 
globalization as well as difficulties in intervening in autonomous social systems”. (Held 2007: 
356) 
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Governance is also seen as an answer to the growing complexity of social systems, which are 
traditionally regulated by the state. The state, due to this complexity, is increasingly 
confronted with lack of knowledge in order to undertake effective regulations. This lack of 
knowledge should be compensated through the involvement of a variety of stakeholders in the 
policy-making process. For Latzer (2007: 345) “the plurality of public and private norm-
setting actors and a plurality of norms, ranging from classical command-and-control-
regulations (laws) to various forms of ‘soft law’ and voluntary agreements, are preconditions 
for regulatory choice”. 
Media governance scholars assume that there is a shift from hierarchical to horizontal control. 
For Puppis (2007: 331) the concept of media governance “encompasses both developments 
and stands for a horizontal as well as vertical extension of government.” Regarding the 
horizontal extension of government Puppis notices that the term ‘media governance’ covers 
both statutory media regulation as well as self- and co-regulation in the media: “While the 
state is not involved in self-regulatory organizations (apart from supposable pressure on the 
industry), co-regulation is taking place within a framework provided by the state and refers to 
a mix of statutory regulation and self-regulation.” (Puppis 2007: 332) 
By co-regulation is meant that private actors, both business and civil society, and the state co-
ordinate the formulation of a specific policy, while through self-regulation the media actors 
and industry associations are left to themselves and can decide and propose their own internal 
regulations. The rationale for such a shift in regulation form lies in the dilemma of reconciling 
media regulation with media freedom. Puppis (2007: 332) describes the dilemma of media 
regulation as always being “between a rock and a hard place”, i.e. the liberal ideals of media 
freedom and the normative needs of modern societies for a democratically viable media 
system. In Puppis words, while there are legitimate societal, economic, and technical 
justifications for media regulation, in democratic societies the media should be devoid of 
governmental influence. Accordingly, media freedom restricts the scope of media regulation. 
In this sense non-statutory media regulation is seen as a solution for the dilemma of media 
regulation: media freedom is respected because the media can regulate themselves. 
On the side of self-regulation there are however some problems, which Puppis (2007: 333) 
recognizes. First, the self-regulation of mass media may indeed favor private interests. 
Second, there are legitimacy problems with the self-regulation of media companies,  i.e. the 
democratic control of media systems would be abolished. Finally, without the threat of 
sanction it is questionable if self-imposed rules will be followed or will remain only on the 
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level of good purposes. On the side of co-regulation some of these problems could be better 
handled through to the involvement of other stakeholders of media policy than the media 
companies. However, as Held (2007: 360f) points out, there should be sufficient incentives 
for the media industry to participate in the co- or self-regulation institutions and “the different 
regulatory cultures have to be kept in mind when designing a co-regulatory system. While the 
broadcasting industry, for example, seems to welcome co-regulation as a form of 
deregulation, the internet industry is more skeptical about it because there is more state 
intervention than in pure self-regulation”. 
Puppis (2007: 333f) suggests a distinction between different domains of media governance in 
order to grasp the different roles of state and private actors in each domain. He divides media 
governance into six domains, which are: organizations, ownership, funding, distribution, 
processes and content. Puppis goes on discussing which form of media governance - between 
self-, co- and statutory regulation - is most suited in order to better handle one domain or 
another, whereas statutory regulation prevails only within the ownership domain and within 
the other domains the debate is about how much self-regulation can be afforded by 
democratic societies. In the end “instead of no state at all, co-regulation is preferred to self-
regulation” (Puppis 2007: 335) because of the lack of results about the effectiveness of self-
regulation and its democratic legitimacy, even if Puppis do not provide valid examples of co-
regulation in these domains. 
By pointing out the importance of interactions, coordination and presumptive participation 
that in fact is no more than a simple consultation, the literature about media governance 
oversimplify the power structures in the media system. Without access to power or the 
possibility to hold media power accountable for deficits in the provision of public goods, the 
new governance regime may offer civil society only a freedom of speech within consultation 
forums. By holding participation in consultative bodies as a new form of democratic 
bargaining, media governance trivializes democratic bargaining theory. In fact without the 
possibility to expose, criticize or sanction media power for unsatisfactory provision of public 
goods, mere consultation structures represents no more than a protest channel. In fact media 
governance scholars seem to tolerate more self-regulation on the industry side, without 
providing the civil society with an institutional setting in order to criticize the results of self-
regulation. 
Media governance studies focuses on the growing complexity of decision-making processes. 
Governance is perceived as complex networks with manifold interactions, with coordinative 
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and discursive steering mechanisms. However, this way of focusing media governance has 
consequences for scientific research. First, hierarchy and power within and between networks 
are ignored as well as the power resources of single actors. Second, command and control 
steering through state and economy is being neglected. Eventually media governance studies 
seem not to be concerned about the problems of unchallenged societal and economic power 
structures which are reflected in unchallenged media power. Media governance studies seem 
to overestimate the problem-solving-capacities of co-and self-regulation and to 
underestimates the legitimacy problems, which come along with new governance solutions. 
One should ask who the stakeholders of media policy are, because the involvement of the 
majority of stakeholders, which are affected by media policy, should help the policymakers 
formulating more efficient regulations of the media system. Moreover, the legitimacy of the 
decision should be enhanced through this direct participation in the policy-making process. As 
Meier and Perrin (2007: 337) points out “media governance is supposed to mediate rising 
conflicts of interest by creating a platform which empowers previously neglected 
stakeholders, mainly civil society, and at the same time encourage the state and media 
organizations to assume their obligations to society.” The authors emphasize that media 
governance may foster the democratization of media and society “by asking whose interests 
dominate media companies, to whose end they operate, and by integrating the ‘neglected’ 
interests into the media organization” (ebd.). 
While state regulation of mass media is a delicate issue, it should be noted that media 
companies that self-regulate themselves is at least as much delicate that the former. Who 
controls the controller? How is accountability of media companies toward society guaranteed? 
How can the public be sure its interests about fair and balanced reporting of societal issues are 
taken into account by the mass media? These questions relate to the democratic deficit of 
media policy. One of the hopes connected to the emerging governance paradigm is that the 
public could get a chance of more participation in media policy processes through civil 
society organisations. 
In the following of this paper the concept of participatory media governance will be firstly 
outlined. In a second step, two case studies about the participation of civil society in media 
governance regulatory bodies will be presented in order to understand if participatory 
governance can resolve the democratic deficit of media policy identified above. 
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PARTICIPATORY MEDIA GOVERNANCE 
The rationale behind the involvement of other actors than the one actually having the 
decision-power lies on the one side in the necessity for a legitimated input and output process 
through the participation of all involved actors. On the other side, so the argumentation, the 
growing complexity of societal and political matters forces the decision-makers to open their 
consultation and decision-process to other actors, which on the basis of their expertise may 
contribute to the decision-process with their specific knowledge. 
In our research project we focus on a participatory conceptualization of governance. From a 
democratic point of view governance may be defined as a new form of participation of all 
relevant stakeholders to a specific societal matter. Participatory governance in this sense may 
represent as overall concept the evolution of the decision-making process from a formal 
institutionalization, which is the classical executive-legislative-judiciary decision-process, to a 
more informal institutionalization, which is a new non-hierarchical decision-making, where 
the involved actors sit at the decision table as equally legitimated stakeholders and assume the 
role of the regulators together with the regulated actors. 
According to Meier and Perrin (2007: 338) the fact that media governance is based on a 
systematic, comprehensive, and institutionalized multi-stakeholder approach allows to 
integrate (neglected) stakeholder interests on various levels, i.e. civil society organizations 
should participate in media governance processes alongside established stakeholders such as 
media organizations, economic interests, and state authorities. 
Why is such a participatory framework important for media policy? The involvement of civil 
society in policy decisions remains a central issue in participatory media governance. Yet, the 
aim should not be a simply consultation of civil society groups, but full participation in the 
decision making process. This can only be achieved through some form of decision rights 
accorded to the participants. Gbikpi and Grote (2002: 25) point out that “participatory 
governance also and still requires some kind of democratic institutional settings. As a matter 
of fact, if participatory governance is a matter of ensuring that relevant actors participate in all 
the various governance arrangements, their quality must depend on their representativeness, 
as well as upon the decision-making procedures chosen by them to perform the arrangement”. 
Gbikpi and Grote stress the fact that with respect to the quality of the governance 
arrangement, it is important “that every holder community has a real opportunity to be 
11 
 
involved in the decision and that every holder in his or her collectivity feels properly 
represented.” (ebd.) 
From the standpoint of mass mediated communication it is clear that every social group in 
modern society is a relevant actor that should participate in the definition of the media policy 
framework, since mass media play an important role by delivering information about 
important political and social issues. Leaving the private media-sector without regulation or 
with weak self-regulation agreements does not comply with the assumption about the 
involvement of relevant stakeholders. Moreover if mass media are an important factor in the 
building of an informed citizenship, it is arguable if not necessary to involve more groups 
representing the different societal interests in the definition of a media policy framework. 
Since political and societal information are in some form public goods the market alone may 
not be able to intercept the needs of the public, in particular where these needs cannot be 
expressed in market values or cannot be identified through classical supply-demand formulas. 
Participatory media policy should also contain elements of direct democracy that allow civil 
society groups to co-determine particular policy outcomes. This would allow a more 
transparent political process. Not only, the political legitimacy of policies could be enhanced 
through co-determination. Participatory media governance should enhance the legitimacy of 
the political process, the accountability of media companies and finally provide a better 
interaction between citizens, civil society interests, economic interest and the state with 
benefits for the whole democratic process. 
In this paper we focus on the participatory approach of Fung and Wright (2003), who 
developed an understanding of a participatory modus of governance. They proposed a model 
of empowered participatory governance by analyzing four institutional reforms aimed at 
improving citizens’ participation in local political matters. On the basis of these participatory 
experiments they identified three general principles that are fundamental to sketch the 
participatory approach. These are: (1) a focus on specific, tangible problems, (2) the 
involvement of ordinary people affected by these problems and officials close to them, and (3) 
the deliberative development of solutions to these problems. (Fung/Wright 2003: 15ff) 
The first principle relates to the practical orientation of participatory governance, i.e. the 
problem, that should be solved through the participation of all important stakeholders, must 
have a direct and substantial impact on the conditions of the involved actors. Secondly, the 
bottom-up participation should “establish new channels for those most directly affected by 
targeted problems” (Fung/Wright 2003: 16). Consequently, the participants may bring their 
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knowledge and particular interest in the formulation of possible solutions. Finally, the third 
principle aiming at a “deliberative solution generation” (Fung/Wright 2003: 17) base itself on 
the assumption that “in deliberative decision-making, participants listen to each other’s 
positions and generate group choices after due consideration”. The three principles 
highlighted by Fung and Wright are bound to three institutional design features that should 
“stabilize and deepen the practice” (Fung/Wright 2003: 15) of participatory institutions. These 
are (Fung/Wright 2003: 20ff): (1) the administrative and political devolution of decision-
power to local action units, (2) the centralized supervision and coordination of the governance 
institutions, which the authors define as new form of coordinated decentralization, and finally 
(3) the design should remain state-centred by reforming existing official institutions along the 
principles of practicability, participation and deliberation. 
Speaking about deliberation processes, Blomgren Bingham et al. (2005: 553) note that 
“participants consider multiple points of view, think critically about problems and potential 
solutions, and, in certain processes, try to render collective decisions that best meet the public 
good”. These preconditions may only be found in participatory governance institutions, 
because of their collaborative nature. Every participant has an interest in the functioning of 
the governance institution and through repeated deliberation all the involved stakeholders get 
to know each other’s long-term positions.  
Innes and Booher (2004), too, focus on the collaboration within participatory governance 
institutions stating that “participation must be collaborative and it should incorporate not only 
citizens, but also organized interests, profit-making and non-profit organizations, planners and 
public administrators in a common framework where all are interacting and influencing one 
another and all are acting independently” (Innes/Booher 2004: 422). They describe such 
processes as multi-dimensional model, where one-way communication from government to 
citizens and vice versa becomes mutual to involve learning and action so that “the polity, 
interests and citizenry co-evolve” (ebd.) 
What we are going to expose as case studies are media governance agreements that are far 
from being new or innovative, but nonetheless they denote and implement some of the 
participatory principles outlined above. However, it must be specified that the work of Fung 
and Wright has its focus on institutional experiments, two in the U.S. and each one in Brazil 
and India, which tried to include local actors in the regulation and implementation of different 
policies. Another characteristic of the following case studies is that, compared to the Fung and 
Wright cases, they may not or can not directly involve citizens. The participatory governance 
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institutions in Fung and Wright are strictly local, while the regulation of media systems is in 
most cases a national concern. Nevertheless, a form of representativeness is chosen in order to 
represent different civil society interest within the agreements. 
The problem with the literature on participatory governance when applied to media regulation 
is that most of the time participation is seen as enhancing governmental effectiveness in the 
regulation of specific issues. Media policy and the regulation of media systems however are 
characterized by the dilemma of state intervention. In fact, one of the most problematic issues 
when discussing the regulation of mass media is how to find an appropriate balance between 
democratic state regulation and the freedom of the press. As Hamelink and Nordenstreng 
(2007: 232) point out “the issue of media governance is quite complicated because media are 
both the object of societal governance as well as the key agents in the formation of images 
about governance in society”. 
Participatory media governance therefore differentiates itself from other forms of 
participatory governance by keeping the state exterior to the governance agreements. This 
does not mean that the state has no role to play. Indeed, the state remains an important player, 
but only in establishing the institutional setting where private actors and civil society may 
meet in order to discuss and regulate the media.  
CASE STUDIES 
In a preliminary research about new media governance forms in different European countries 
(Portugal, Spain, France, Germany, Denmark, Austria, The Netherlands and Greece) we asked 
the members of the Euromedia Research Groups about new developments in the field of 
media regulations in their own countries. The questionnaire’s aim was to find out in which 
country the most interesting agreements were implemented. Unfortunately, the respondents 
were (mostly) not able to indicate new governance agreements. In few cases there was the 
introduction of new self-regulating institutions (Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle Fernsehen in 
Germany, Etat Generaux de la Presse in France) or the creation of independent political 
regulation bodies (Autorità per le Garanzie nelle Comunicazioni in Italy, Consell de 
l'Audiovisual de Catalunya in Spain), where the members of the body are elected by 
parliaments or by members of the government. Both cases are for the purpose of our research 
project of secondary importance, since the formers involve only industry representatives 
while the latters are too politicized to be perceived as bottom-up approach. Moreover in 
responding to the question about the involvement and influence of civil society organizations 
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in media policy decisions or agreements all the respondent were skeptical about any kind of 
relevant impact on the decision-making process, whereas on the other side all respondents 
rated the influence of professional lobbies as fairly high. 
The case studies presented in the following of this paper where chosen based on the given 
participation of civil society. It must be specified that the two governance institutions 
presented here are not the result of a modern shift from top-down government to horizontal 
governance. In fact, both advertising regulation institutions in France and the UK were 
founded long before the beginning of the governance debate (although both were reformed in 
recent years and bottomed-up as initiative of the industry). The analysis is based upon both 
documentary analysis and semi-structured expert interviews with representatives of the civil 
society involved in the decision-making process and institution officials1 2. 
It must be specified that the advertising regulation in France and the UK is not a strict co-
regulation between media industry and civil society, because in both cases the codex is 
formulated by councils formed only by media professionals. Nonetheless in both cases the 
civil society is involved in a consultative manner, i.e. every change in the regulation codex is 
discussed first with the representatives of the civil society, which may not change the codex, 
but their opinions are factually taken seriously. Therefore in both cases we may speak about 
self-regulation with a sort of deliberative co-operation. Where the civil society plays a role is 
in the implementation of the codex by judging the advertising content either a priori in a pre-
clearing manner or a posteriori due to filed complaints. 
France Advertising Regulation 
The history of France’ advertising regulation is a long one. The regulation of advertising 
already began in 1935 with the creation of the Bureau de Verification de la Publicité 
(Advertising Review Office) and was recently reformed. From the perspective of the civil 
society it was an important reform, since for the first time the representatives of civil society 
organizations where involved in the regulatory agency. The reform was initiated following the 
 
1 In France the interviews involved Jean-Pierre Teyssier, president of the Autorité de regulation professionnelle 
de la publicité (Advertising Regulation Authority) and former president of the European Advertising Standart 
Authority, and Michel Bonnet, chairman of the Conseil Paritaire de la Publicitè and representative of the civil 
society organization Famille de France 
2 In the UK the interviews involved Olivia Campbell, spokesperson of the ASA, and Neil Watts, member of the 
Advertising Standard Authority and representative of the Association of School and College Leaders 
15 
 
                                                
EU White Paper on Governance (EU 2001) and the recommendations proposed in the EU-
document Better Regulation (EU 2003) and culminated in 2008 with the creation of the 
Autorité de Regulation Professionnelle de la Publicité – ARPP (English: Professional 
Advertising Regulatory Agency), which is chaired by Jean-Pierre Teyssier who was 
interviewed as an expert, and the three related institutions: the Conseil de l’Ethique 
Publicitaire, the Jury Deontologique de la Publicité and the Conseil Paritarie de la Publicitè. 
The latter is where civil society participates and eventually the centre of the analysis in this 
paper. 
The Conseil Paritaire de la Publicité (CPP) is a place for dialogue and cooperation between 
representatives of civil society (mostly consumers’ and environmental associations) and 
representatives of the advertising and media industry. The CPP has 18 members – 9 
professionals, 9 civil society representatives – and is chaired by one of its members who 
comes from the associative sphere. Currently the CPP is chaired by Michel Bonnet, who was 
interviewed for the purposes of this research. The mission of the CPP is to alert the ARPP 
Board of Directors on the expectations of different associations or organisms concerning the 
content of advertisements. It also contributes to the discussion on the constant re-evaluation of 
the self-regulatory codes. 
UK Advertising Regulation 
In the United Kingdom advertising is regulated by two codes that are administered by the 
Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) and the Broadcasting Committee of Advertising 
Practice (BCAP). Both committees are self-regulatory, i.e. the participating parties are 
exclusively media industry actors. However, the complaints are judged by the Advertising 
Standard Authority3 which is composed by one third of industry representatives and two 
thirds of independent members. Independence is a very important feature of the ASA non-
industry members, meaning that even if the members are in some case representatives of civil 
society organizations they can not participate in deliberation involving their organizations. 
Every member of the ASA should act as individual and “exercise moral authority rather than 
[…] act as representatives of any particular industry or interest” (Interview with Olivia 
Campbell, spokesperson of the ASA). 
 
3 The ASA was established in 1962 with the main goal of ensuring that all advertisements 
which are published in the UK are both honest and decent (cfr. ASA 2009).  
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The rationale behind the British advertising regulation is based on the assumption that, due to 
the high number of advertisements, verification a priori is not possible. Every citizens in the 
UK may freely file a complaint that must firstly be judged as receivable. If the complaint 
passes the receivable-test and after an informal mediation talk with the affected parties, the 
ASA council is charged to instruct an investigation. Finally, if it is ruled that the 
advertisement is infringing the advertising codes it must be pulled back from public viewing. 
In addition to that the deontological infringement is made public on the basis of what in the 
UK is named name and shame strategy. 
EVALUATION 
In order to assess the participatory characteristics of the two case studies we rely on five4 
critical questions that Fung and Wright (2003: 30) developed to analyze their cases of 
participatory governance. The answers to the following questions are extrapolated from the 
documents and interviews with involved experts of the two governance institutions. However, 
it must be noted that some questions may not be answered on the same basis as Fung and 
Wright, because in the field of media regulation there are always some restrictions related to 
the freedom of the media. 
1. How genuinely deliberative are the actual decision-making processes? 
Fung and Wright (ebd.) point out, that “equitable decisions depend upon parties agreeing to 
that which is fair rather than pushing for as much as they can get”. Every expert, who was 
interviewed for this paper has emphasized how the discussions within the councils were 
agreeable and no one found, that within the councils there were remediless clash of interests. 
Neil Watts from the ASA-Council noted that: 
You often forget who is representing industry and who is representing society. In 5 years 
experience within the ASA the decisions were rarely taken with disagreement between the 
media side and the society side. 
Speaking about how he perceives the deliberation-process within the ASA-Council he goes 
further and states that: 
                                                 
4 Fung and Wright specified six questions, but in the following of this evaluation only 5 questions are treated, 
since one of them relate to the transfer of knowledge to local units and in both case studies there are no such 
units. 
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We are just a team of people. Sometimes the media representatives say something from their 
background, which is useful to us to know and the other way around. We simply bring bits of 
information to the discussion table. 
On the same line of thought was Michel Bonnet from the Conseil Paritaire de la Publicité, 
who underlines how even the media representatives were astonished at how fair and balanced 
the deliberation process within the CPP was. Both sides learned how to learn from the other 
side and in the end it is a win-win situation. 
2. How effectively are decisions translated into action? 
Both governance institutions in France and the UK are very effective in the translation of their 
decision into action. However, in France there is a more comprehensive procedure, where the 
advertisers are pre-advised about the content of their advertisements, while in the UK the 
ASA-Council acts only due to complaints made by individuals or organizations. Nevertheless, 
in the UK a company or advertising agency may be forced to ask a copy-advice, which is like 
the a priori check in France, if it was previously punished for other advertisements. The pre-
diffusion control in France is done by a group of lawyers and experts of advertising 
deontology within the ARPP, while in the UK the advertiser may freely choose to get a pre-
advice, so called copy-advice, in order to be sure that they are not infringing the advertising 
codes. 
Neil Watts notes that the ASA is successful, quick to respond and less expensive than using 
the law, but clearly dependent on industry (financial) support and government thrust. 
Speaking about how the ASA-decisions could influence and regulate the advertising industry 
he stated that: 
In the UK it is very clear that the publication of one assessment of judication against an 
advertiser will appear on national news and national newspaper. In fact not having a 
complaint being upheld by the ASA is very important for industry representatives and media 
companies. The assessments are regularly given attention in the broadcasts programs. The 
public judication of a decision of the ASA is very powerful. 
On this ground the best way to effectively auto-regulate the industry is thought to be a public 
and independent judgment of the problematic advertisements, which could be highly penalise 
the image of concerned brands. 
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3. To what extent are the deliberative bodies able to effectively monitor the implementation of 
their decisions? 
According to Fung and Wright (2003: 31) the implementation of deliberatively taken 
decisions demands also mechanisms for monitoring and accountability. The implementation 
of the decisions both in France and the UK is not formally monitored. One could say that the 
monitoring of advertising is largely done by the public itself. In France the ARPP starts each 
year a new monitoring about specific issues.This is done officially as exploration of a new 
advertising issue in order to report to the authorities, e.g. the reports on advertising and 
environment and advertising and female representation in 2007, on advertising and ethnic 
diversity in 2008 (cfr. ARPP 2009). 
In the UK the monitoring task is performed directly by the CAP and BCAP, thus it is formally 
a self-monitoring by the industry. In a similar manner as the ARPP in France, the monitoring 
surveys are done regularly on specific issues by ad hoc monitoring groups (cfr. CAP 2009). 
4. To what extent do the deliberative processes constitute “schools for democracy”? 
Fung and Wright (2003: 32) argue that “by seeing that cooperation mediated through 
reasonable deliberation yields benefits not accessible through adversarial methods, 
participants might increase their disposition to be reasonable and to transform narrowly self-
interested preferences accordingly”. In fact all the interviewed experts agree that the 
governance experience within the advertising regulation bodies has positive effects on their 
perception of the media industry. Michel Bonnet notes how, since the inception of the CPP, 
every participant is committed to active listening of other positions and even if there is a 
disagreement the deliberations are based on the search of a “best” common denominator.  
Bonnet emphasizes however how important it is, that the civil society representatives are 
trained regarding advertising issues. Without such training an effective deliberation would not 
be possible between advertising professional and non-professional. The civil society 
representatives must know how the industry thinks and works in order to effectively regulate 
advertising. In this sense the ARPP as well as the ASA offer regularly staff training about the 
state of the art in the industry and about important legal and ethical problems related to 
different advertising content issues, both for civil society representatives and advertisers. 
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5. Are the actual outcomes of the entire process more desirable than those of prior 
institutional arrangements? 
One must note that in both countries there were no big changes in how the advertising 
industry is regulated in the last decades. Nonetheless, the experts were asked about the 
benefits of such participatory governance approaches especially from their perspective of civil 
society’s representatives. On the participation of civil society in the ASA Neil Watts stated 
that: 
It helps the councils to have a cross-section of society on its memberships. The representation 
of civil society within the ASA is excellent both in a gender and professional manner. 
The self-regulation of the industry too is praised as crucial feature for the success of the 
regulation efforts. Jean Pierre Teyssier notes how important it is, that the representatives of 
the industry maintain some form of control over the advertising codes. If not, there would be 
no participation of the advertisers. Neil Watts too is convinced about the necessity of a self-
regulating institution, because it brings a form of regulation which the media professionals are 
more comfortable with and over which they have a significant influence. 
Teyssier points out that the accountability and transparency of the ARPP towards the 
government and the public are as crucial as the self-regulation of the industry. Accountability 
and transparency are guaranteed by the public reports, which the ARPP publishes on his 
website, by the involvement of civil society organizations in the decision-making process and 
by the coverage that mass media give to the decisions of the ARPP. 
Neil Watts resumes the benefits of the regulation of advertising through the ASA by stating 
that: 
The ASA gives confidence to society that if there is an advertisement which appears violent, 
racist or generally advertising that should not be seen in the public arena, the public can take 
action. It also helps advertisers in the sense that it polices the industry by preventing others 
advertisers from use shock advertising. It keeps everybody (in the advertising industry) equal 
and gives consumers the right to complain, which is separate from the state and the law. 
Asked about the potential transfer of the participatory approach from advertising regulation to 
other media regulation issues all experts agree that it could be possible under specific 
conditions. The most important one is the self-regulative feature of any media governance 
agreement. Without some form of self regulation the media professionals and media 
companies may feel threatened in their freedom of expression respectively in their media 
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freedom. All experts agree that we are moving towards more self-regulation and are 
optimistic that their experience in participatory media governance institutions may become a 
school for media democracy.  
FROM MEDIA REGULATION TO PARTICIPATORY MEDIA 
GOVERNANCE: STILL A LONG JOURNEY 
The growing complexity of media systems is often used as a rationale for the emergence of 
media governance, for the shift from top-down hierarchical political decision to more flexible 
and horizontal decision-making, but eventually a change within the decision-making 
structures reflect the need for a better approach to some political issues through some kind of 
regulation. Because, as we have seen, media governance is still regulation, from mandatory 
regulation to co- and self-regulation. 
However, one must notice that in the academic discourse about media governance there are 
only examples of participation of neglected interest in the media policy process. This is 
regrettable especially from a democratic point of view. In fact, if we are moving from top-
down media policy to more horizontal and self-regulation processes, one could ask, what 
about the democratic legitimacy of such processes? If the democratic state is going to step 
aside, who is going to replace the democratically elected politicians, which participate in 
media politics as representatives of different constituency? Freedom of the media should not 
mean freedom from regulation or freedom from democratic control. In fact, if the benefit of 
the governance approaches is the shift away from over-politicized media regulations toward 
multi-stakeholder approaches, then there should be more consideration about the neglected 
stakeholders, because as McQuail (1997: 511f) argued “the principal dilemma faced is how to 
reconcile the increasing significance of media with the declining capacity to control them, on 
behalf of the general good”. In fact, it would be absurd to let the media regulate themselves as 
an answer to the growing complexity of and the loss of control over media sytems. 
In order to answer the questions about how may civil society participate and how this 
participation is perceived, the governance approaches to advertising regulation both in France 
and UK are good examples for the involvement of civil society organizations in media 
governance institutions. With the analysis of the two governance institutions we have learned 
that: 
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1. The deliberation process within the CPP and the ASA-Council is perceived as a 
benefit to both the advertising industry and the civil society organizations, which 
achieve a better understanding of the counterpart. This is a fundamental feature of 
participatory governance approaches, then it allows a conflict resolution based on 
rather achieving what seems reasonable and fair than pushing for as much as one can 
get. The governance experience and the deliberative processes within the advertising 
regulation in the UK and in France should therefore be taken as good example of the 
successful involvement of civil society organizations in the regulation of media 
matters. 
2. The advertising councils in the UK and France offer a platform where neglected 
stakeholders can assert their interests towards media organizations and the state, which 
on this way may better assume their obligations, as Meier und Perrin pointed out 
(2007: 337). Since the market alone may not be adequate in order to intercept the 
needs of the public, these governance institutions are seen as the right place for 
additional intermediation and better mutual understanding. More information and 
interaction could even ameliorate the so praised market mechanisms. 
3. Making the decision public is also a very important feature for the implementation of 
the decisions, not only as discouraging “name and shame” strategy towards the 
advertisers, but also as form of accountability towards the public. This publicity 
should be seen as an effective form of sanctioning, where the public is regularly 
informed about the shortcomings of the regulated actors. It is also a way of holding 
media companies accountable for their published contents, which will be critically 
discussed in an open manner. Negative publicity due to a decision of the councils is 
perceived as equally if not more efficient sanction than financial fines. On the other 
side it remains unclear to what extend are some civil society organization legitimated 
to participate in the governance institution.  
4. The coexistence of self-drafted codes with an enforcement council where civil society 
interests are represented conciliates the dilemma between media regulation and media 
freedom. In fact, the advertising industry seems to accept that non-industry 
representatives judge the advertising content as long as the draft of the regulating code 
remains an initiative of the industry. 
Despite the cooperative experiences in the advertising regulation the way towards more 
democratic accountability of media companies is still a long one. Advertising governance is 
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just a small step in the cooperation between the media industry and the civil society in the 
regulation mostly of moral issues related to this pervasive form of communication. But media 
content is not only advertising. Democratic media governance be it traditional media 
regulation or participatory media governance should not be limited to advertising regulation, 
but expand to all issues related the production and consumption of media products. Therefore 
we conclude with three recommendations that should foster a democratic media governance 
in such media sectors that are vital for the diffusion of political and social information. 
1. In order to achieve a more democratic regulation of media matters the media 
companies should be firstly encouraged to adopt self-regulating codes, which must be 
open to public scrutiny and discussion in every sector, from media ownership to 
editorial policies. 
2. Following the deliberative experience of advertising regulation various councils 
should be instituted, where civil society and media professionals’ representatives may 
interact in a constructive way. This would allow an open exchange of information that 
may help both sides. 
3. Within this intermediation process the state has still a role to play, especially by 
pressuring the media industry to adopt self-regulating codes and by fostering 
governance agreements where civil society organizations as stakeholders may 
participate. Moreover, the state should institutionalize some form of professional 
training for civil society organizations, which are affected by mass media. 
Participatory media governance could reinvigorate the democratic legitimacy of mass media 
towards the civil society firstly by giving the organized interests within the civil society some 
decision power at least over the implementation of the codes, and secondly by assuring media 
companies that they are on the right way to satisfy the needs of their most important 
stakeholders, namely the public who buys their products. 
In our research project “From Media Regulation to Democratic Media Governance” we will 
further research the self-regulation of media companies by investigating to what extend self-
instituted mechanisms such as corporate social responsibility allows them to respond to the 
demands of the public and other neglected stakeholders. 
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